Indian Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 5

2011

New Crimes Under the Information Technology (Amendment) Act
Amlan Mohanty

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/ijlt

Recommended Citation
Mohanty, Amlan (2011) "New Crimes Under the Information Technology (Amendment) Act," Indian Journal
of Law and Technology: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/ijlt/vol7/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indian Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact library@nls.ac.in.

2011]

103

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 7, 2011
NEW CRIMES UNDER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
(AMENDMENT) ACT
Amlan Mohanty*
ABSTRACT
This paper delineates the legislative response to cyber crime in India with an analysis
of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 focussing on the new crimes
introduced by the amendment, on the touchstone of cyber crime legislative standards
across jurisdictions. Thus, a brief look at the jurisprudential basis for criminalisation
of cyberspace activities has been undertaken, following which, the new crimes have
been examined section-wise. The paper uses the theoretical framework set out in the
first section to probe the various problems that the Amendment Act poses in light of
bad drafting and lack of understanding in the area.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 22, 2008, the Information Technology (Amendment) Act,
2008 was passed by the Lok Sabha with almost no discussion whatsoever.1 The
Bill had been introduced in 2006 and in the wake of the terrorist attacks in
Mumbai on November 26, 2008, the Act was passed as a reactionary measure.2
The fact that the Bill was not discussed prior to it being passed is clear in its
drafting. In some places, apart from being just poorly drafted, it is also vague
and criminalises offences without defining the scope of the activity that could
classify as criminal.
The Bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha on December 23, 2008, and received
Presidential assent in early 2009. However, even after this, the Act did not
come into force until October 26, 2009, when it was notified by the Central
Government.3 The Act though passed in such a rush did not come into effect
until a year later. This time could have been used to discuss the Bill and address
the various problems with it.
This essay looks at the new offences introduced by the Amendment Act as
a legislative response to the increasing threat of cyber crime in India today, and
analyses these offences in light of similar provisions in other jurisdictions. The
essay first looks at the jurisprudential basis for criminalisation of activities over
the internet. In this section, the essay looks at self-regulation as an adequate
means of policing the internet and whether government intervention and
criminalisation of cyberspace activities is necessary. The section concludes with
a brief framework which is used in the analysis of the provisions in the rest of
the essay. Various new offences introduced by the Act have then been studied
section-wise, using the framework as explained in the first section. The scope
of this essay is thus limited to the new crimes introduced by the amendment
and determining the adequacy of the legislative response to the growing need

1

2

3

Pavan Duggal, IT Act Amendments – Perspectives by Mr. Pavan Duggal, CYBERLAWS.NET, http://
www.cyberlaws.net/new/pd_on_ITAmendments.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
Karen M. Sanaro & Christyne Ferri, India’s New Information Technology Law Impacts Outsourcing
Transactions, ST. B GA., June, 2009, http://www.technologybar.org/2009/06/indias-new-informationtechnology-law-impacts-outsourcing-transactions/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
Press Release, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology (October 27, 2009),
PIB.NIC.IN, http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=53617 (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
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for a legislation that brings within its fold emerging forms of cyber crime. The
essay concludes by looking at the various problems that the Amendment Act
poses in light of bad drafting and lack of understanding in this area.
II. REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE
A. Need for regulation of cyberspace activities
A good starting point for an illuminated argumentation on the
criminalisation of activities in cyberspace is the aspect of regulation of these
activities itself and associated questions of its desirability, necessity and feasibility.
The rhetoric of the cyber libertarians, seeking self-regulation of the internet,
while challenging perceived essentialities for any kind of regulation, like
territorial boundaries, real relationships and notions of property, is firmly
grounded on the assertion that cyberspace is capable of being regulated through
the creation of institutions and mechanisms for the regulation of conduct in
cyberspace through the formulation of community based rules that are
constituted, decreed and enforced by its participants without necessitating state
intervention. On the other hand, those demanding government regulation stress
on the inadequacy of such a system to combat instances of grievous criminality.
A closer look at the contentions of both parties provides an academic space for
a discussion on the criminalisation of cyberspace activities and a canvas to
contextualise the nature of offences introduced by the amendment.
The cornerstone of the self-regulation theory is that the absence of
government involvement in regulatory mechanisms does not result in
cyberanarchy and suggests that the application of geographically based
conceptions of legal regulation to cyberspace activities makes no sense at all,
and further, that cyberspace participants are better positioned than the
government to design a comprehensive set of rules that are cheaper to enforce
and are practically sound.4 The justification for such an idealistic viewpoint is
buttressed by moral considerations often expressed by the participants of
cyberspace who unequivocally express their objections to being disciplined by
orders of the government and declare the space that they have created for
themselves to be independent of the tyrannies of government order.5
4
5

Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65(1) U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited December 5, 2009).
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Entrusting the internet community with the power to create legal rules and
institutions will overcome inherent difficulties associated with geographical
determinacy and territorial enforcement and evolve into a mechanism to govern
a wide range of new phenomena that have no clear parallel in the non-virtual
world,6 thus saving the legislature the time and energy to draft laws to deal with
such situations. The proponents of self-regulation draw credibility from their claim
that State laws enacted to deal with cyberspace activities have been unsuccessful,7
and that existing laws and methods of lawmaking are inadequate,8 and so, the
internet should be self-regulated. The underlying principle entrenched in these
views is that cyberspace is the antithesis of regulations and the impracticalities of
regulation by external forces including law enforcement forces are too compelling
to make such an attempt. The dispensability of government intervention is
intimately twined with the complicated nature of social relationships in cyberspace,
wherein criminal acts are reprimanded by third party Internet users who impose
community defined sanctions on offenders as a form of punishment akin to State
law enforcement mechanisms that seek to penalise the same crimes by utilising
additional State resources with less than desired effects.
B. Need for criminalisation of offences in cyberspace
To highlight the limitations of self-regulation, or the opposite parties’
contentions in this case, would be to make a case for the criminalisation of
offences in cyberspace through State intervention, a position several scholars
have taken with the advent of serious offences and increasing criminality on
the internet such as paedophilia, cyber frauds, data theft, impersonation and
cyber terrorism.9 The typical self-regulation punishment model is centred on
banishment from the group,10 a procedure for social control that appears lenient
and lacking in deterrence value as opposed to criminal sanctions imposed by
the State to deter any destructive or anti-social conduct in cyberspace. It appears
6

7

8

9
10

David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 (5) STAN. L.
REV. 1367 (May, 1996).
Jason Kay, Sexuality, Live Without A Net: Regulating Obscenity And Indecency On The Global Network,
4CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 355 (1995).
Keith J. Epstein & Bill Tancer, Enforcement of Use Limitations By Internet Services Providers: How To
Stop That Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber, 9 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 661664 (1997).
S.V. JOGA RAO, LAW OF CYBER CRIMES AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW 10 (2004).
Based on terms and conditions of access and use, imposed by service providers, commonly referred to
as ‘netiquette’.
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that the stream of anti-governmentalism has been laid to rest in view of the fact
that the internet has quite simply become too mainstream, and being the
preferred platform for electronic commerce, the need for governmental regulation
cannot be ignored.11 Perhaps the greatest argument in favour of criminalising
unlawful conduct on the internet is its distinctiveness from territorial crime.
The very fact that cyber crimes are easier to learn how to commit, require fewer
resources relative to the potential damage caused, can be committed in a
jurisdiction without being physically present in it and the fact that they are
often not clearly illegal12 make criminalisation of such conduct not only
important, but essential. The conclusion that must be reached is that the State
must step in with some level of regulation of cyberspace.13
C. Types of offences to be criminalised
An analysis of the new crimes introduced by the IT (Amendment) Act on
the touchstone of cyberspace conduct sought to be criminalised by statutes and
conventions around the world would help in determining the suitability and
stringency of the new sections in the Indian scenario.
There are essentially four main types of conduct that a domestic legislation
should penalise - (1) offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of computer data and systems, (2) computer-related offences with the intention
to defraud, (3) content related offences, and (4) offences related to infringements
of copyright and related rights.14 In order to acquire a jurisprudential
understanding of cyber crimes in general, and to gain a critical insight into the
nature of offences introduced by the amendment and whether they serve the
function expected of them, it is important to comprehend why these particular
forms of conduct are criminalised across jurisdictions. Further, it is also essential
to understand the range of unlawful conduct that involves computers. With
11

12

13

14

Robert Shaw, Should the Internet be Regulated, 2(4) IFO INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH 42 (October, 2000), http://www.ifo.de/DocCIDL/Forum401-pc1.pdf (last
visited December 14, 2009).
MACCONELL INTERNATIONAL, CYBER CRIME... AND PUNISHMENT? ARCHAIC LAWS THREATEN GLOBAL
INFORMATION, (World Information Technology and Services Alliance, 2000), http://www.witsa.org/
papers/McConnell-cybercrime.pdf (last visited December 1, 2009).
David S. Wall, Cybercrimes: New Wine, No Bottles?, in INVISIBLE CRIMES: THEIR VICTIMS AND THEIR
REGULATION ( Pam Davies, Peter Francis &Victor Jupp eds.,1999).
European Convention on Cybercrime, Guidelines for member states, 2001, http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm (last visited December 12, 2009).
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the first, second and fourth type of conduct, private individuals may not be able
to detect and proceed against the perpetrators and it therefore falls upon the
State to intervene and impose criminal sanctions. It is necessary to criminalise
acts falling within the third category as they are offences that shock the
conscience of society and threaten public morality.
III. NEW CRIMES UNDER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
(AMENDMENT) ACT, 2008
Having erected a framework for comparative scrutiny of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter, “IT Act”) with cyber crime legislative
standards across the world, it is plainly visible that the IT (Amendment) Act,
2008 (hereinafter “ITAA”) was introduced to tackle unresolved cyberspace
issues such as internet fraud, pornography, data theft, phishing etc., that were
not explicitly covered under the old legislation but are at the heart of internet
activity, nevertheless.
A. An overview of changes under section 66 and 67
Under the old act, criminal offences were specified under Sections 65,15
66 and 6717 of Chapter XI (“Offences”). The provisions were broad in scope
and encompassed typical cyber crimes without specificities, a possible explanation
for 175 out of the 190 cases in total being booked under Section 66 and 67 of
the IT Act, 2000.18 With the introduction of new offences under the
Amendment Act, there are a host of differentiated offences that have criminal
penalties attached to them. The new offences range from sending of offensive
messages, hardware and password theft to voyeurism, pornography and cyber
terrorism, which have been inserted through amendments to Section 66 and
67 of the IT Act, 2000 and form the focus of this paper. In addition, the civil
wrongs set out under S.43 of the IT Act have now been qualified as criminal
offences under the ITAA 2008, if committed dishonestly or fraudulently.19
16

15
16
17
18

19

Section 65 deals with ‘Tampering with computer source documents’.
Section 66 deals with ‘Hacking with Computer Systems’.
Section 67 deals with ‘Publishing of Obscene Information’.
NATIONAL CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, CYBER CRIME STATISTICS (2007), http://ncrb.nic.in/cii2007/cii2007/CHAP18.pdf.
Section 66, IT (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2008.
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B. Critical analysis of the new offences introduced by the Amendment Act
(i) Sending of Offensive Messages (S.66A)
The introduction of S.66A20 to the IT Act, 2000 unarguably expands the
scope of the act to deal with instances of cyber stalking, threat mails, spam and
phishing mails, with an attempt to strengthen the law and circumscribe aspects
of unlawful cyber conduct that were left untouched under the old legislation,
but a few flagrant issues do emerge on closer inspection of the provision.
The wording in this section has an element of ambiguity in the phrase
‘menacing character’, which though perceptibly intended to protect against
instances of threat mails or cyber stalking, is too broadly articulated to serve as
an effective tool to combat the said offence. While the term ‘grossly offensive’
does find mention in similarly purposed legislations, the word ‘menacing character’
is conspicuously absent from statutes used by governments to combat instances of
cyber stalking and threat mails,21 which is of assistive value in the assertion that
the phrase is misplaced. The expected ineffectiveness of S.66A(a) may be illustrated
by the simple example of an employer using a mildly harsh tone in an e-mail
correspondence with his employee in order to censure him, declaring possible
termination if the employee’s indolence continues, or a friend remarking to another
in jest, that he will ‘beat him up’ if he fails to get tickets to the movie they had
planned to watch the following weekend. In both cases, one may trace elements
of ‘menace’, so to speak, when it evidently does not exist. Neither does the
legislation speak of circumstances where there is reciprocity of sentiments.

20

21

Section 66A: Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,–
a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance,
inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill
will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or
inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such
messages, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years
and with fine.
See, S.1(a)(i), MALICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 1988,(United Kingdom) http://www.harassmentlaw.co.uk/law/act.htm#, and relevant sections, S.1 and S.4, PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT ACT, 1997,
available at http://www.harassment-law.co.uk/law/act.htm#, and CRIMINAL CODE (STALKING) AMENDMENT
A CT, 1999, (Australia) available at www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/1999/
99AC018.pdf.
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The fundamental problem with the section, moving on to clauses (b) and
(c), is simply that several of the words used in the section such as ‘inconvenience’,
‘annoyance’, ‘obstruction’ or ‘ill will’ are not defined either in the primary or
Amendment Act, leading to uncertainty in interpretation and increasing the
possibility of misuse of the provision, a possible reason for some statutes drafting
defences to the charge, within the section itself.22 However, the efforts of the
legislature to address developing situations of cyber crime such as threat mails,
e-mail and SMS spamming, cyber stalking and phishing, must be commended.
(ii) Theft of Computer Resource (S.66B)
The relevant section to be analysed in this regard is S.66B23 of the
Amendment Act, which appears to deal with situations where there has been
theft of a ‘computer resource’ or ‘communication device’. Under this section, an
individual who receives a stolen computer, cellphone or any other electronic
device fitting the definitions contained within the Act maybe imprisoned for
up to three years. Using this section, the police may tackle the growing menace
of trading and purchase of stolen laptops and mobile phones, with the caveat of
a potentially adverse result ensuing wherein purchasers of second hand phones
may be considered suspects or wrongfully charged under this section.24
There may be an allegation of redundancy of this section given the preexistence of a criminal provision for ‘dishonestly receiving stolen property’ 25 with
identical phraseology and punishment, but such an accusation may be displaced
if one exercises scrutiny over the relevant definitions. ‘Computer resource’ has
been defined to include ‘data’,26 thus markedly different from the IPC provision,
22

23

24

25

26

Title 47, Section 223(e), COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, 1997 (United States of America), available
at http://www.cybertelecom.org/cda/47usc223.htm..
Section 66B: Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen computer resource or communication
device knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen computer resource or communication
device, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years or with fine which may extend to rupees one lakh or with both.
Naavi, Is ITA 2000 Stringent Enough on Cyber Criminals?, NAAVI.ORG PORTAL ON INDIAN CYBER LAW
(February, 2009), http://www.naavi.org/cleditorial09/editjan27itaaanalysis12deterrance.htm (last
visited December 12, 2009).
Section 411, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860: Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property,
knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 2(1)(k), INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000: “computer resource” means computer,
computer system, computer network, data, computer data base or software.
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the significant implication being that an electronic document, CD or text
message containing stolen information may be brought within the umbrella of
‘computer resource’. In terms of technological significance, this can be extended
to include theft of digital signals of TV transmissions.27
Interestingly and more importantly, one finds that this section is in
consonance with the statements of objects and reasons of the IT Act, 2000 and
ITAA, 2008 as it stresses on the need to protect e-commerce and e-transactions
involving informational exchange and electronic data exchange.28 With the
introduction of S.66B, and the criminalisation of stolen information transmission
and retention, there is a crucial deterrent factor attached to illegitimate or illegal
data exchanges which is the primary focus of the IT Act itself. The immediate
focus of the Amendment Act, inter alia, is the prevention of cyber and computer
crimes and utilising the framework laid down previously in this paper and the
identification of unlawful cyberspace conduct, it is also known that offences
against the availability of computer data and systems (including the ‘misuse of
devices’ with respect to sale, procurement, import and distribution) must be
criminalised29 and the section succeeds in doing so.
(iii) Identity Theft and Impersonation (S. 66C and S. 66D)
An examination of identity theft protection laws for internet users indicates
that the harm sought to be prevented is not radically different from the territorial
crime of the same nature. The basic nature of the crime involves the use of
identifying information of someone to represent oneself as the individual for
fraudulent purposes, essentially, the wrongful appropriation of one’s identity by
another.30 While familiar traditional crimes of identity theft would include
forgeries featuring credit cards, thefts and making of false statements, online
27

28

29
30

Naavi, Information Technology Act 2000 Amendment Details unveiled, NAAVI.ORG PORTAL ON INDIAN
CYBER LAW (December, 2008), http://www.naavi.org/cleditorial08/editdec25itaaanalysis1.htm (last
visited December 12, 2009).
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Information Technology Act, 2000, available at http://
naavi.org/ita2008/objects2008.htm and Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Information
Technology Amendment Act, 2006, available at http://naavi.org/ita_2008/index.htm (last visited
December 12, 2009).
Supra note 11.
Neal K. Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 (4) U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (2001).
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versions of the same crime merely involve the use of computers with similar
consequences, for example, logging into someone’s account and making a
defamatory statement, online shopping using someone else’s credit card etc.
Prior to the amendment act, the crime of identity theft was forcibly brought
under S.66 within the ambit of ‘hacking’,31 which presupposes that there was
an infiltration of a computer resource involving ‘alteration, deletion or destruction’
of the information residing therein, facilitating the crime of identity theft.
However, under the new provision, S.66C,32 the means by which the identifying
information is accessed is discounted and only the act of making fraudulent or
dishonest use of the information itself is criminalised. The benefit of separating
the two offences cannot be overemphasised, given that a separate criminal
provision exists for extraction of such data through fraudulent means.33
While S.66C deals with deceitful use of passwords, electronic signatures
and the like, S.66D34 involves use of a ‘communication device’ or ‘computer resource’
as a means of impersonation, which in effect, entails the use of computers,
cellphones and PDA’s for fraudulent purposes. While the former provision
includes intangible but unique identifiers and symbols attached to individuals,
the latter envisages instances where the offender has physical access to someone
else’s personal devices. However, in the absence of a clear definition of ‘unique
identification feature’ and the advent of new forms of cyber crime such as SMS
spoofing,35 there may exist grey areas relating to identity theft, such as the misuse
of cellphone numbers, which, in the strict sense, may not be consistent with
31

32

33

34

35

Section 66, IT ACT, 2000: (1) Whoever with the intent to cause or knowing that he is likely to cause
wrongful loss or damage to the public or any person destroys or deletes or alters any information
residing in a computer resource or diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously by any means,
commits hacking.
Section 66C, ITAA, 2008: Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly makes use of the electronic signature,
password or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable
to fine with may extend to rupees one lakh.
Section 43 under the IT Act imposes civil penalties for such acts, but after notification of the IT
(Amendment) Act, 2008, under Section 66, it is a criminal offence if mens rea exists.
Section 66D: Whoever, by means for any communication device or computer resource cheats by
personating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees.
See Vineeta Pandey, Cell Abuse: SMS Spoofing’s Forgery, THE TIMES OF INDIA, July 18, 2004, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Cell-abuse-SMS-spoofings-forgery/articleshow/782197.cms (last
visited December 16, 2009).
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the idea of a ‘unique’ identification feature of an individual, and not fitting the
definition of ‘computer resource’ or ‘communication device’ under S.2(1)(k)
and (ha), may lie outside the scope of both, S.66C and S.66D, which is a
serious concern for cyber crime officials.
A comparative analysis of the punishment stipulated under these provisions
with identity theft provisions of other jurisdictions may be attempted to critically
examine the nature of punishment under the Amendment Act. One must
acknowledge the fact that similar legislations have different degrees of
punishment based on the nature of crime committed subsequent to the identity
theft taking place, a provision that could have been transplanted into the Indian
legislation to make it more comprehensive, instead of having a uniform
punishment of three years for the crime of identity theft.36 So, for example, if
the crime involves drug trafficking, or is a violent crime, the punishment is
lesser37 than if the offence is committed to facilitate an act of domestic terrorism.38
It may also depend on the value of goods or money accumulated over a period
of time as a result of the identity theft39 and may also vary based on the number
of identifying markers stolen.40
(iv) Voyeurism (S. 66E)
Based on the theoretical framework laid down earlier, the offence of
voyeurism would locate itself under the heading ‘content-related offences’ and
based on the subject of the crime, may be slotted into the category of crimes
against individuals, specifically, against their person. While the Expert
Committee’s Report made a recommendation for imprisonment for a period of
one year and fine not exceeding rupees two lakh,41 the Amendment Act
36

37

38

39

40

41

See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 1028 112 Stat.
3007 (1998).
See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 1028(b)(3)(A)
112 Stat. 3007 (1998).
See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 1028(b)(4) 112
Stat. 3007 (1998).
See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 1028 (b)(1)(D)
112 Stat. 3007 (1998).
See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 1028(b) 112
Stat. 3007 (1998).
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE, http://www.mit.gov.in/
download/ITAct.doc (last visited December 16, 2009).
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prescribes imprisonment for a period of three years but similar fine of rupees two
lakh. However, it does not make mention of compensation to the victim which
was explicitly recommended by the Expert Committee, to the tune of rupees
twenty five lakhs.42
The issue that immediately springs up on an analysis of the provision is
whether it is appropriate to refer to the wrongful conduct represented in the
section as ‘voyeurism’ in the literal sense since ‘observation’ of the ‘private
area’ of persons is not criminalised. While this is understandable if one assumes
the circumstances under which the offence was introduced in the Bill43 as not
requiring such a provision, since it was not observation as such, which was the
concern at the time, but rather, capturing, transmitting and publishing the
image of private parts of an individual.
However, on glossing over the Standing Committee’s Report, it is clear
that it acknowledges the emergence of new forms of computer misuse and is
concerned with situations of ‘video voyeurism’.44 Based on these considerations,
it is absurd to exclude from the purview of the section, the ‘observation’ of
private areas of a person. To reinforce this assertion, we may divert our attention
to similar criminal legislations, which do include ‘observation’ within the section,
such the Sexual Offences Act, 2003 of the United Kingdom45 and the Canada
Criminal Code.46 It is also relevant to note that these statutes include viewing
of ‘private acts’ besides ‘private areas’ of persons, which has been ignored in the
Amendment Act. Finally, the observation that may be made, taking into account
cyberlaw jurisprudence and the nature of acts that the IT Act seeks to
criminalise, is that viewing of such images or videos through online streaming
on a website such as YouTube or downloading and viewing on a communication
device or computer resource as defined under the Act should also have been
specified as illegal within this particular section.
42
43

44

Id.
One of the main circumstances for the introduction of this provision was the DPS MMS scandal.
The scandal involved a video clip featuring two students from Delhi Public School, one of whom
recorded the video on his cellphone, distributed it to his friends, which was further forward to the
others, eventually finding its way on to the internet and being listed for sale online. The episode
resulted in criminal proceedings being launched against the CEO of Baazee.com. See Avnish Bajaj v.
State, 2008 150 D.L.T. 769.
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE (2006), ¶¶ 3 and 6,
available at http://www.naavi.org/cleditorial07/standingCommitteereportita2006.pdf (last visited
December 16, 2009).
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(v) Cyber Terrorism (S.66F)
Perhaps the most contentious issue in relation to the Amendment Act is
that of cyber terrorism, which is essentially the convergence of terrorism and
cyberspace.47 Terrorism, by itself is not a new phenomenon, but with the
development of modern technologies, the creation of laws specifically dealing
with the same or related acts, conducted through the medium of cyberspace,
was imminent.
An analysis of this section can be fractioned into the first and second clause,
the subject matter of each being considerably dissimilar with their own particular
complications. The section is comprehensive in that sub-clause (A) first
enumerates the methods by which the act is committed, the wrongful conduct,
as it were,48 and then proceeds to describe the potential damage that may be
caused by such acts. However, in the portion describing the likely damage, the
definition is restricted to cases linked to destruction of property or death of
individuals.49 While the clause also speaks of damage to essential supplies and
critical information infrastructure, there is no mention of damage to private
property. Using the generally accepted definition of cyber terrorism,50 it is clear
that damage need not be restricted to property belonging to the government.
So long as it induces fear in the minds of people, it may be regarded as terrorism.
Also, being a provision specific to cyber terrorism, it is surprising that the term
45
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Section 67(1): A person commits an offence if— (a) for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification,
he observes another person doing a private act, and (b) he knows that the other person does not
consent to being observed for his sexual gratification....
Section 162(1): Every one commits an offence who, surreptitiously, observes — including by
mechanical or electronic means — or makes a visual recording of a person who is in circumstances
that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy....
Supra note 9, at 62.
See Section 66F 1(A) (i), (ii) and (iii).
Section 66F 1(A):...and by means of such conduct causes or is likely to cause death or injuries to
persons or damage to or destruction of property or disrupts or knowing that it is likely to cause
damage or disruption of supplies or services essential to the life of the community or adversely affect
the critical information infrastructure....
‘Unlawful attacks against computers, networks and the information stored therein, when done to
intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objective’, Peter
Grabosky & Michael Stohl, Cyberterrorism, 82 REFORM 8 (Autumn, 2003).
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‘virtual properties’,51 belonging to both the government or private citizens, has
not been used anywhere in the section.52
In the second sub-clause,53 predominantly dealing with access to sensitive
information, data and computer databases (possibly belonging to the military),
there is no explicit mention of specific cyber-related activities or offences, which
may have provided additional clarity as to the manner in which the penetrated
data or information may be used to imperil the security of the State. For example,
the data may be used to locate sensitive targets, private bank accounts may be
used to fund terrorist programmes and terrorist propaganda may involve
dissemination of confidential data divulging military capabilities of the State in
question. It is obligatory for the definition to cover acts involving the internet
such as money settlement through internet banking, use of internet channels
to communicate terrorist plans across countries, hacking and defacement of
governmental and non-governmental websites, virus and trojan attacks aimed
at secure infrastructural and cyber assets of the country etc.54 What is undesirable
is to have an overlap of functional definitions between the IT Act, the IPC
and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act as this will only create ambiguities
and loopholes that will aid the terrorists eventually. Thus, the section does not
seem comprehensive enough to cover most unlawful conduct on the internet
that would typically be associated with cyber terrorism.
In an effort to analyse and contrast this section with similar criminal
provisions across territorial jurisdictions, we may divert our attention to the
issue of punishment prescribed under the section and whether the section is
devised in a manner that exhibits recognition of international developments
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Virtual property may include accounts, websites, virtual currency, virtual housing spaces and other
real estate in cyberspace, virtual pets, weapons and characters etc.
See Naavi, ITA 2000 Amendment Bill defines Cyber Terrorism, prescribes life sentence, BLOGGER NEWS
NETWORK (December, 2008), http://www.bloggernews.net/119157 (last visited December 10, 2009).
Section 66F 1(B):...knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without
authorisation... any restricted information, data or computer database... so obtained may be used to
cause or likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of
the State....
Naavi, IT Acts Amendments and Cyber Terrorism, M ERI NEWS (December, 2008), http://
www.merinews.com/article/it-act-amendments-and-cyber-terrorism/152449.shtml (last visited
December 8, 2009).
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in cyber crime, especially in relation to cyber terrorism. Considering the
content of the law, there does not appear to be widespread discrepancies
with cyber terrorism-centred legislations across the world taking cognisance
of the fact that there is an increasing use of computers to facilitate attacks of
terrorism,55 and that ‘it is safer and more convenient to conduct disruptive
activities from a remote location over the Internet than it is driving planes
into buildings’.56 As regards penalties, imprisonment for life appears to be the
norm across jurisdictions57 and uniformly the harshest amongst all internetrelated crimes.58
It is inconceivable to think that the cyber terrorism provision in the ITAct
will lie stagnant in the years to come, given the dynamic nature of terrorist
activity, which is bound to traverse yet unforeseen criminal territories, but it is
discomforting to see that the first legislation addressing the incidence of cyber
terrorism falls drastically short in terms of comprehensiveness, clarity and
particularity.
(vi) Sexually Explicit Content and Child Pornography (S.67A and S.67B)
Without entering into complicated questions of internet content regulation
and obscenity on the internet, an analysis strictly of the provisions of the
amendment Act reveals the section dealing with sexually explicit content, S.67A,
a sub-section of S.67, which was present prior to the Amendment Act, to be
well drafted and clearly defined. The terms used in the section such as ‘publishes’,
‘transmits’ have been previously defined in the act, assisting interpretation of
the section to a considerable extent. In terms of penalties, compared to S.67,
S.67A has an enhanced imprisonment term as well as fine for both first and
subsequent convictions. Since the offence of obscenity is not a new addition to
the list of offences, it has been excluded from the scope of this paper.
55

56
57

58

E.g., in Australia, § 100.2(2)(h) and (i) of the Criminal Code Act (Cth), include the term
‘electronic communication’, to stress on the increasing use of computers as a medium in terrorist
activities. The Criminal Code Act was amended by the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism)
Act, 2002.
Yee F. Lim, CYBERSPACE LAW: COMMENTARIES AND MATERIALS 353 (2007).
See Section 66F(2) of the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 and Section 101.1(1) Criminal Code Act
(Cth).
Supra note 56, at 355.
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On the matter of child pornography, S.67B is a welcome introduction to
the list of offences under the IT Act, particularly for the stringency that has
been embedded into the provision, with not only ‘publishing’ or ‘transmitting’
of pornographic content involving children, constituting offences, but so also
its collection, online viewing, downloading, promotion, exchange and
distribution. This is in contrast to the offence of voyeurism as operationally
defined under this Act, and previously discussed in this paper, which does not
criminalise the act of viewing itself. The problem with the section however, is
definitional, with ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase ‘abusing children
online’,59 when read along with S.67B(e) which also discusses abuse in relation
to children, but specifically mentions the phrase ‘sexually explicit’ to indicate
the nature of abuse. The absence of the same in the previous sub-clause leads
on to believe that the constitution of ‘abuse’ under S.67(d) is not of a sexual
nature, although it is not necessary that they must be mutually exclusive. Further,
the use of the word ‘indecent’ in S.67B(b) appears problematic when read in
conjunction with the word ‘obscene’ placed before it in the same sub-clause
given that in India, there are obscenity tests laid down through precedent,60
but nowhere has the word ‘indecent’ been defined or explained.
C. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
In order to support the view that an absence of clarity in criminal statutes
is indeed a ground for protest, the researcher would like to briefly examine the
Doctrine of Void for Vagueness, indigenous to the American legal system,
having been derived from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.61 The basis of the doctrine is uncertainty
and lack of specificity and the philosophy underlying the principle appears to
be quite simple - no one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to
speculate as to the meaning of a penal law.62 Thus, if it is found that a reasonably
prudent man is unable to determine by himself the nature of the punishment,
59
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Section 67B(d) of the Information Technology Act, 2008.
See Rahul Matthan, Obscenity and Pornography on the Internet, in THE LAW RELATING TO COMPUTERS
AND THE INTERNET 45 (2000).
Void for Vagueness Doctrine, LAW.JRANK.ORG, http://law.jrank.org/pages/11152/Void-VaguenessDoctrine.html (last visited on April 24, 2011).
Id.
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the prohibited conduct as envisaged under the statute, and what class of persons
the law seeks to regulate, for lack of definiteness, the law may be regarded as
‘void for vagueness’.63 The objective of a criminal statute is fairly simple, allowing
citizens to organise the affairs of their lives with the knowledge of acts that are
forbidden by the law, and the negation of this should logically be considered an
infirmity of the legal system.
The researcher has used the example of this doctrine to buttress the argument
that a criminal statute must be drafted with precision, leaving no room for
ambiguity, particularly with reference to phrases that enumerate classes of persons,
acts constituting an offence or a generic term that may be susceptible to multiple
interpretations. Thus, for example, the phrase ‘gangster’ when used in a penal
statute, may render the statute void, since the phrase is open to wide-ranging
interpretations, both by the court and the enforcing agencies.64
While there exist several such instances, the author would like to limit the
illustrations to this one specific case, merely to demonstrate the fact that mere
uncertainty in a single phrase of a hastily drafted statute could render the law
unconstitutional and void, thereby necessitating precaution in the framing of
penal statutes that are bound to affect a majority of citizens, as is certainly the
case with a statute regulating activities on the internet in a country as large as
ours.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 serves as a suitable
case study for an analysis of the legislative exercise of law and policy formulation
in the field of cyber crime legislation, revealing quite emphatically the need for
carefully worded provisions, foresight in the drafting process and imagination
with respect to explanations to particular sections. The inadequacies of the
legislation and the resultant realistically anticipated problems reinforce the notion
that criminal legislations cannot be left open to broad interpretations, especially
with regard to internet regulations, considering the fact that cyberspace provides
63
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A. G. A., The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109(1) U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960).
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
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certain liberties in action that make it easier to transgress laws, and with such
characteristics inherent to the environment, any regulatory mechanism or
legislative measure must seek to be comprehensive, clear and narrow in
interpretive scope.
While the purpose of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act was
to address increasing trends of cyber crime and in effect, make it difficult to be
a cyber criminal, the irony rests in the fact that what the Amendment Act
eventually has created is a situation wherein it perhaps, isn’t ‘easier to be a
criminal’, but rather, ‘easier to be classified as a criminal’. The danger, in both
cases, cannot be overemphasised.

